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Buyer  competition  in  the  price  discovery  process  for  slaughter  lambs  at  an  Oklahoma
teleauction  was studied.  Number  of buyers positively influenced  both absolute  and relative sale
prices  but  did not  significantly  affect  buyer  gross  margins.  Buyer  market  shares  also  affected
prices  paid and  buyer gross margins.  Thus,  competition  among  buyers was  found to be impor-
tant in the price discovery  process.
Morgenstern  argued  in the early  1970s
that economic  theory had contributed lit-
tle  toward  understanding  the  price  for-
mation  process.  A  decade  later,  R.  Ward
placed  the  pricing  process  among  the
priority topics on the research  agenda for
agricultural  marketing  economists.  One
element  of the  pricing  process  is the  im-
portance  and  impact  of  competition  (as
measured  by  the  number,  size,  location,
and  efficiency  of  buyers)  on  price  level.
Paul  noted  that  industrial  organization
economists  deal  with  price  performance
at a relatively aggregative  level. Relative-
ly  little empirical  evidence  exists  regard-
ing the  importance  of buyer  competition
on  prices  received  by  sellers  at  the  firm
level.  Menkhaus,  et al. suggest  data limi-
tations  rather  than  lack  of  interest  pre-
clude economists  from empirically  study-
ing  structural  impacts  on  prices  for
agricultural  commodities.
This article reports results of an empir-
ical analysis of the importance and impact
of competition  among buyers in the price
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discovery  process  for  slaughter  lambs.  It
is  intended  to contribute  toward  a theory
of  price  discovery  and  a  better  under-
standing of competition  at the microecon-
omic level.
Conceptual  Framework and
Hypotheses
Thomsen  and  Foote  define  price  dis-
covery  as the process of buyers and sellers
arriving  at  a  transaction  price  for  a spe-
cific quantity and quality of a commodity
at  a  specific  time  and  place.  Their  de-
scription  of  the  process  consists  of  two
phases.  Phase  one  involves  buyers  and
sellers  evaluating  supply  and  demand
conditions  and  determining  the  general
level  of  prices  around  which  specific
transaction  prices fluctuate.
At any point in time, neither buyers nor
sellers  know  exactly  the  shape  and  loca-
tion  of  supply  and demand  curves  for  a
given commodity  for some future period.
However,  buyer  and  seller  estimates  of
demand  and  supply  schedules  are  as-
sumed  to be  normally  distributed  around
the  true  schedules.  Then,  prices  corre-
sponding  to  the  extreme  points  of inter-
section  of the  estimated  schedules  repre-
sent  a  band  of  potential  prices  withinWestern Journal  of Agricultural Economics
which specific transaction prices fluctuate.
The price band  width depends on a num-
ber  of  factors,  e.g.,  geographic  market
area, how  far forward price  estimates are
made,  accuracy  of  grading or  describing
the commodity,  and availability  of infor-
mation  to  buyers and  sellers,  among  oth-
ers.
Phase  two  of  the  price  discovery  pro-
cess  involves buyers and sellers determin-
ing  the value  and price  of  a  specific  sale
lot  of  the  commodity  traded.  Buyers  es-
timate  the  value  to them  of  the  sale  lot,
then discover  the sale price via some pric-
ing  mechanism,  such  as  private  negotia-
tion or auction  (Tomek).
Interviews  with  lambpackers  indicated
that  the  price  discovery  process  for
slaughter  lambs  is  similar  to the  process
for slaughter cattle  (Ward,  1979).  Buyers
begin with a basic economic  identity, that
profit  equals  total  revenue  minus  total
costs.  For  lambpackers  that equation  can
be expressed  as
7r = [(WLP  x  CWT)  + PPL]
-[(LPL  x  LWT)  + SLC]  (1)
where  ir is  profit,  WLP  is  the  wholesale
lamb carcass  price, CWT is the lamb car-
cass  weight, PPL  is the pelt price  for No.
1 grade  pelts,  LPL  is the  slaughter  lamb
price,  LWT  is  the live  lamb weight,  and
SLC  is  slaughter  and  related  costs  (i.e.,
cooler  shrink  and  transportation,  among
others).  Lamb  buyers rearrange  equation
(1) and solve  for LPL,




Packers estimate their total returns from
sale  of the  carcass,  pelt, and  byproducts;
subtract their estimated  slaughter and  re-
lated costs and a profit target; and convert
net  returns  to  a live  weight  basis to  esti-
mate  their  break-even  price,  given  as-
sumptions  made  in  their  estimates.  This
process  parallels  phase  one  of  the  price
discovery  process. Carcass  and pelt prices
parallel  the  general  price  level  for  each
respective commodity.  Packers  implicitly
or  explicitly  estimate  ranges  of  expected
prices as well  as costs and  profits in order
to develop a band or range of prices with-
in which  live lamb prices will likely  fluc-
tuate during the trading  period.
Phase  two  consists  of  determining  the
value  of a  specific  sale lot of  lambs given
its  location,  lot  size,  sex,  and  estimated
grade, weight, and  yield of lambs, among
other  factors.  Then  a  sale price  is  discov-
ered  via some  pricing mechanism.  Actual
sale price depends on many factors, among
them are the number and quality of lambs
for sale, supply and demand  conditions of
individual  buyers  and  sellers,  and  com-
petition  among buyers.
Both microeconomic  and industrial  or-
ganization  theory  suggest  that  increased
buyer competition has a  positive effect on
sale  price  (Henderson  and  Quandt;  Sher-
er).  The expanding  literature  on electron-
ic  marketing  supports  that  theory.  In
nearly  all  cases  to  date,  electronic  mar-
keting  has  had  a  price  enhancing  effect
for sellers  (Henderson  and Baldwin; Hen-
derson and  Holder; Holder; Russell; Spor-
leder and Davis; and Ward,  1982b). Often,
increased buyer  access to the trading  ses-
sion  and  reduced  buyer  concentration
have accompanied  higher prices.  Thus,  it
is unclear  how  much  price  enhancement
resulted:  (1)  from  buyers  being  able  to
better match  price  with  the value  of  the
commodity  due  to improved  description
of the  sale  lot;  (2)  from  an  equal  distri-
bution of information to buyers  about the
commodity available for sale and an equal
opportunity  to  bid  on  sale  lots;  (3)  from
reduced  buying  costs  which  were  then
passed  back  to  sellers;  or  (4)  from  in-
creased competition among buyers during
the trading  session.  This  study focuses  on
the latter possibility.
A  positive  relationship  between  buyer
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competition  and  price  means  there  is  a
concomitant  negative  relationship  be-
tween  competition  and  buyer  profits and
gross  margins.  If  increased  competition
leads  to higher  prices  paid  by  buyers  in
equations  (1) and  (2),  it increases  packer
costs and reduces packer profits and  gross
margins  (cet.  par.).
Bain hypothesized that with high levels
of concentration,  the largest buyer can de-
press prices paid to sellers.  Love and Shuf-
fett  and  Menkhaus  et  al.  found  results
supporting  that  hypothesis.  Aspelin  and
Engelman;  Holder; and  Ward  (1981)  also
found that an increased number of buyers
had  a positive  effect  on  price.  However,
Ward  (1982a,  1983);  and  Williamson  et
al. found  different  results  when  studying
market  structure  impacts  on  prices  and
margins  in other  situations.  Their  studies
found no significant relationship  between
buyer  market  shares  and  prices  paid  to
sellers  or  packer  gross  margins.  Differ-
ences  in  results  may  be  due  to  different
methodologies,  data,  or  market  condi-
tions, among other reasons.  Regardless, the
effects  of  buyer  competition  in  the price
discovery  process  are  unclear and empir-
ical results  have been inconsistent.
In this  study, the absolute  and relative
impact  of  competition  (i.e.,  number  and
size of buyers)  on prices, and the absolute
impact  of  competition  on  gross  margins
were  estimated.  Hypotheses  tested  were:
(1) that number of buyers  positively influ-
enced the selling  price  of lambs  and neg-
atively  influenced  the  gross  margins  of
buyers;  and  (2)  that buyer  market  shares
had  no impact  on selling  prices  of lambs
and gross margins of buyers.
Data and Procedures
A  group  of  producers  organized  and
operated  a slaughter  lamb  teleauction  in
Oklahoma  from  March  1979  until  Feb-
ruary  1982,  when  they  began  marketing
lambs via  computerized  auction.  Produc-
ers  conducted  a  lamb  teleauction  sale
whenever  they  could  pool  at  least  one
semi-trailer truckload of lambs, thus spon-
soring 58 sales over  the 35-month period.
Teleauction  records  provided  much  of
the  data  for this  study.  Pre-sale  data  in-
cluded  estimates  on the number of lambs
for sale, their average  weight, grade, and
pelt grades,  number  of lambs  discounted
(i.e.,  buck  lambs  and  tailed  lambs),  and
price discounts for lambs varying  from the
standard  or  base  type  of  lambs  (e.g.,  for
weight, grade, and other factors).  Sale data
included  the  number  of  buyers  on  the
conference  telephone,  opening  bid,  bid
sequence by bidder, sale price, and buyer.
Post-sale  data included  delivery date and
place, actual number and weight of lambs
by seller, final live-weight  grade of lambs,
and actual number and average weight of
lambs  in  the  sale  lot.  Weekly  average
wholesale  prices  for  choice  grade  lamb
carcasses  at  New  York,  No.  1 grade  pelt
prices  at  northern,  river,  and  southwest-
ern  markets,  and  choice  grade  slaughter
lamb prices at San Angelo, Texas were ob-
tained  from  "Livestock-Meat-Wool  Mar-
ket  News:  Weekly  Summary  and  Statis-
tics,"  AMS-USDA.
A  description  of  the  slaughter  lamb
pricing process  was based on  personal  in-
terviews with the two largest  buyers from
the  Oklahoma  teleauction,  and  supple-
mented  with  published  information  (En-
gelman et al.; Ward, 1979).  The two larg-
est buyers  purchased  59.8  percent  of  all
lambs  sold  by  teleauction  in  Oklahoma
from  March  1979 to February  1982.
Models were specified and estimated by
OLS  regression  to measure the  impact of
competition  and  market  structure  on
prices paid  and  on buyer's  gross margins.
Independent  variables  in  equations  re-
ported here were selected  on the  basis  of
economic  theory,  hypothesized  relation-
ships, theoretically correct coefficient signs,
and  statistical  significance  of  the  coeffi-
cients.
Slaughter  lamb  prices  trended  down-
ward over  the  1979-82  period  so  a  vari-
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able  was  included  to  remove  the  trend
variation  (TRD) in  prices.  Zero-one dum-
my  variables  were  added  to  account  for
the  seasonality  found  in  slaughter  lamb
prices  (Usman and  Gee).I
Variables that normally affect the price
for a specific  sale lot  of lambs in the sec-
ond  phase  of the  price  discovery  process
include  number  of lambs per sale  lot, es-
timated  weight  of  the  sale  lot,  and  esti-
mated weight  of lambs  sold,  among  oth-
ers. Teleauction  sales were in semi-trailer
truckload  lots.  Forty-six  of  the  58  sales
were  single-truckload  lots,  11  were  two-
truckload  lots,  and  one  was  a  three-
truckload  lot.  Lamb weights,  grade,  and
condition  varied  among  sale  lots  but  the
pooling process reduced such variation and
increased quality consistency compared to
single-owner lots. Consequently,  variables
for such factors as lot size, lot weight, and
average  sale  weight  were  not  significant
and  were  omitted  from  models  reported
here.
Buyer competition  was hypothesized  to
be important  in the  second  phase  of the
price discovery  process,  especially  during
the  teleauction  (i.e.,  when  lambs  were
auctioned  to  buyers  over  a  conference
telephone  call).  Elements  of  competition
hypothesized  to  be  important  were  the
number, size,  and location  of buyers.
Bain defined  a very highly  concentrat-
ed  oligopoly  market  structure  as  one  in
which  the  four  largest  firms  account  for
75  percent  or  more of  market  sales.  The
four  largest  lamb buyers  in  the  U.S.  ac-
counted  for  56.4  percent  of  sheep  and
lambs  slaughtered  in  1978  (Packers  and
Stockyards  Program). The closest buyer to
the  Oklahoma  teleauction  was  approxi-
mately 365 miles from the teleauction  as-
sembly  site  and  the  farthest  buyer  was
about 920 miles away.  Buyers were locat-
ed  in  Texas,  Colorado,  South  Dakota,
Minnesota,  Illinois,  and  Michigan.  The
1Factor demand theory and equation (2) suggest that
slaughter  and  related  costs  should  be incorporated
in the model but data  were  not available.
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four  largest  buyers  purchased  83.3  per-
cent of all lambs sold by teleauction.  Thus,
the buyer market structure is estimated to
be a very highly concentrated  oligopsony,
according to  Bain's classification  scheme.
Models  Specified
Three  models  were  specified  and  esti-
mated.
Model A
Model A was specified to determine:  (1)
the absolute  price impact  from the  num-
ber  of  packers  bidding  at  each  teleauc-
tion; and  (2)  whether  or not  packer mar-
ket shares affected  prices  paid for lambs.
Model  A incorporated  variables  hypothe-
sized  to  be  important  in  both  phases  of
the price  discovery  process.  Model  A  was
LPL = f(WLP,  PPL, TRD, DQi,  LB,,  BUY)  (3)
where  LPL is the slaughter  lamb price at
each  teleauction  ($/cwt.),  WLP  is  the
weekly average New York price for choice
grade  50-55  pound  lamb  carcasses  ($/
cwt.)  the week  of the teleauction,  PPL  is
the northern, river, and southwestern price
for No.  1 grade pelts ($/pelt) the week of
the teleauction,  TRD  is a  trend  variable,
DQi is a zero-one dummy variable for sea-
sonality  (e.g.,  January,  February,  March
was DQ1), LB,  is a zero-one  dummy vari-
able for the ith buyer (i.e., one per teleauc-
tion),  and  BUY  is the  number  of packers
bidding on each sale  lot of lambs.
The pricing  process  followed  by  pack-
ers  suggests  that  wholesale  lamb  carcass
prices and pelt prices  are of primary im-
portance in estimating revenue from lamb
and  byproducts  sales.  This  parallels
Thomsen  and  Foote's  first  phase  of  the
price  discovery  process.  Thus,  wholesale
carcass prices  (WLP) and pelt prices (PPL)
were included  in the model and  were ex-
pected to be positively related to slaughter
lamb  prices. 2
2 Nominal prices were  used in the  analysis.
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Industrial  organization  theory  suggests
the largest  buyer  in such a market  struc-
ture  can  depress  prices  paid  to  sellers
(Bain).  It  was  hypothesized  that  larger
buyers  paid  less  for  lambs  than  their
smaller  competitors.  Zero-one  dummy
variables for  packers  (LBi)  were included
to determine  whether  there was  a  signif-
icant  difference  between  prices  paid  by
larger  or smaller  packers,  as measured by
market  shares  of  total  teleauction  sales. 3
Prices  paid by packers  could be higher or
lower depending  on when purchases were
made  (i.e.,  during  high  or  low  price  pe-
riods), thus providing further rationale for
including time related variables  (i.e.,  TRD
and  DQi).
Number  of  buyers  was  also  hypothe-
sized to be an important element  of com-
petition.  Thus, the number of packers bid-
ding  on  each  sale  lot  (i.e.,  at  each
teleauction)  (BUY)  was  included  in  the
model  and  was  expected  to be positively
related to sale  price.
Model B
Model B was specified to determine:  (1)
the  absolute  impact  of  the  number  of
packers  bidding  at  each  teleauction  on
buyer  gross margins;  and  (2)  whether  or
not  packer  market  shares  affected  buyer
gross margins.
It  was  hypothesized  that  competition
would have a positive impact on sale price
and  a  simultaneous  negative  impact  on
gross margins of packers purchasing lambs.
Gross margins were estimated  by
GRM = [(WLP  x  YLD)  + PPL]-  ](LPL  + TRC)]
(4)
where  GRM  is  the gross  margin for  each
buyer  of  teleauctioned  lambs  ($/hd.),
3  Using  market  shares  limits interpretation  of  results
because  market  shares  measure  the  relative  size of
buyers  in  the  market  studied  but  do  not  measure
their  absolute  size.  Market  shares  may be  as  much
a function of buyer location relative to the  teleauc-
tion location  than buyer size and efficiency.
WLP,  PPL, and  LPL are the same as de-
fined  earlier,  YLD  is  the  dressing  per-
centage, assumed to be 50  percent  for all
sale lots, and TRC is an estimate of freight
costs  ($/cwt.)  from  the  assembly  site  to
the slaughter plant.4 Thus, the first brack-
eted  expression  is  an  estimate  of  returns
from lamb carcass  and  pelt sales and the
second bracketed expression is an estimate
of costs of lambs plus transportation. Gross
margins  must  cover  slaughter  costs  (in-
cluding  cooler  shrink  and  other  in-plant
costs),  transportation  costs  from the plant
to  retailer,  and  a  profit.  Then,  Model  B
was
GRM = f(TRD,  DQi,  LBi,  (BUY) (5)
where  all  variables  are  the  same  as  de-
fined  earlier.
Estimation results for Model  B were ex-
pected  to nearly mirror  results  for Model
A.  However, transportation  costs from as-
sembly  site to packing  plant  were incor-
porated  into Model  B. Thus,  Model  B  in-
corporated  number,  size,  and  location  of
buyers.
Packers  purchasing  lambs  at  different
times  (e.g.,  during  low  or high  price  pe-
riods)  may  have  higher  or  lower  gross
margins.  Thus,  time  variables  were  in-
cluded  to  remove  any  variation  due  to
trend (TRD) and seasonality  (DQi) in gross
margins.
It  was  hypothesized  that  the  largest
packer  in an oligopsonistic  market struc-
ture would  have a competitive  edge over
smaller buyers  in terms  of gross margins.
If  larger buyers  paid  less for  lambs, they
would have higher gross margins to cover
slaughter  costs  and  earn  a  profit  than
smaller  buyers  (cet.  par.).  Thus,  dummy
variables  for  each  packer  (LBi)  were  in-
cluded to determine  whether there was  a
significant  difference  in  gross  margins
among larger  and smaller  buyers.
4 Freight cost estimates were based on a 45,000 pound
truckload  of  lambs,  @  $1.80  per  hundredweight
rate  per  loaded  mile,  times  the  number  of  miles
from  assembly site to packing plant.
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Competition  in the form  of number of
buyers  (BUY)  was  hypothesized  to nega-
tively affect  gross margins of buyers.
Model C
Model C was specified to determine the
relative  price impact from the number of
packers bidding at each teleauction.  Price
differences  were computed between  tele-
auction prices and weekly average slaugh-
ter  lamb prices  at  San  Angelo,  Texas  for
the same week  as the teleauction,  by
PDIF = LPL  - SAP  (6)
where  PDIF  is  the  price  difference  ($/
cwt.),  LPL  was  defined  earlier,  and  SAP
is  the  weekly  average  choice  grade
slaughter  lamb  price  at  San  Angelo  ($/
cwt.).  Model C  was
PDIF = f(TRC,  BUY)  (7)
where  all variables  were defined  earlier.
Price  differences  between  the  teleauc-
tion and San Angelo market averaged $.37
per  hundredweight  in  favor  of  the  tele-
auction.  The  mean  was  not  statistically
significantly different from zero at the a =
.10  level.  However,  price  differences
ranged from  -$10.75 to +$6.75 per hun-
dredweight,  and  differences  were  from
-$4.88 to  +$5.62  per hundredweight  95
percent  of the  time.  Model  C  was  speci-
fied  to determine  whether buyer  compe-
tition explained the variation in price  dif-
ferences.
Estimated  transportation costs  between
assembly  site  and  packing  plant  (TRC)
were hypothesized  to explain a significant
portion  of  the  variation  in  price  differ-
ences.  It was also hypothesized that buyer
competition  (BUY)  would  positively  af-
fect the price difference.
TABLE  1. Estimation  Results  of  Alternative
Model  Specifications.a
Dependent  Model A  Model B  Model C Dependent
Variable  LPL  GRM  PDIF
Intercept  12.369  7.359***  -1.373





TRD  -. 189***  .055*
(2.17)  (1.98)
DQ1 -. 602  .022
(.44)  (.02)
DQ 3 1.055  -1.495
(.84)  (1.18)
DQ4  1.891  -2.541*
(1.27)  (1.80)
LB2 -1.176  1.501
(1.01)  (1.29)
LB3 1.125  -1.723
(.90)  (1.38)
LB4  .892  -2.590
(.39)  (1.16)
LB 5 -1.601  -.124
(.88)  (.07)
LB6 -1.773  -. 485
(.79)  (.21)
LB 7 .753  -1.088
(.24)  (.35)
LB8 4.168*  -4.709*
(1.77)  (1.96)
BUY  1.105**  -. 702  .595**
(2.26)  (1.64)  (2.16)
-. 224
(.33)
n  56  56  57
R2 .900  .365  .080
DW  1.715  1.770  2.260
a Numbers in parentheses  are absolute values of cal-
culated  t-statistics; and  *** = .01,  ** = .05,  and *=
.10  significant levels.
Empirical Results
Estimation  results  for  all three  models
are shown in  Table  1.
Model A
Wholesale  lamb  carcass  prices  (WLP)
were  positively  and  significantly  related
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TABLE 2.  Teleauction  Purchases  by  Buyers,
1979-82.
Number  Number  Percent of
of Lots  of Lambs  Total Lambs
Packera  Purchased  Purchased  Purchased
LB1 23  10,815  35.9
LB2 12  7,209  23.9
LB3  11  4,970  16.5
LB4  3  2,115  7.0
LB5 4  2,100  7.0
LB6 2  1,270  4.2
LB 7 1  856  2.8
LB8 2  780  2.6
Total  58  30,115  99.9b
a Identified  by buyer dummy  variable found in Models
A and  B.
b  Sum does not equal 100  due to rounding.
to  teleauction  prices  for  slaughter  lambs
as  expected,  based  on  derived  demand
theory and phase one of the  price discov-
ery process.  Pelt  prices  (PPL) did not ex-
plain a significant amount of the slaughter
lamb price  variation,  despite being  a  fac-
tor in lambpackers'  pricing  process.
Slaughter  lamb  prices  exhibited  a  sig-
nificant  downward  trend  (TRD)  over the
period studied. The seasonal dummy vari-
ables  (DQi) explained less  of the variation
in  teleauction  prices  than  was  expected,
though  seasonality in prices  was account-
ed for in part by the wholesale  lamb car-
cass  price  variable.
Buyer dummy variables in Table 1 (LBj)
are listed in descending order of the num-
ber of lambs purchased  from the teleauc-
tion. Buyer  purchases are shown  in Table
2.  The  largest  buyer  (i.e.,  measured  in
terms  of  the  share  of  teleauction  lambs
purchased)  paid significantly  lower prices
($4.17/cwt.)  than  did  the  smallest  buyer
(LB8).  Other  packers  did  not  pay  signifi-
cantly  different  prices  than  the  largest
buyer.
Number  of  buyers  bidding  on  each
teleauction  sale  lot  (BUY)  was  positively
and significantly  related to slaughter lamb
prices.  Thus,  competition  (i.e.,  measured
in terms of the number of buyers  actively
bidding)  significantly  affected teleauction
prices.  Number  of  potential  bidders  per
teleauction  ranged  from  7  to  10  (i.e.,
number  of  buyers  on  each  conference
telephone  call),  while  active  bidders
ranged from 2 to 7, averaging 3.79. As the
number  of  buyers  increased,  so  did  the
teleauction  price.  Each  additional  buyer
increased  sale  price  by  $1.10  per  hun-
dredweight.
Model B
Coefficient  signs  for Model  B were op-
posite those in  Model  A  in most cases,  as
expected.  Gross  margins  trended  signifi-
cantly  upward  over  the  study  period
(TRD) and packer gross margins were sig-
nificantly  lower  in  the  fourth  quarter
(DQ4) than the second  quarter.
The  largest buyer's  gross margins from
teleauction  purchases  were  significantly
higher  ($4.71/hd.)  than  gross margins  of
the smallest buyer (LB 8). Gross margins of
the largest buyer relative to the remaining
buyers were not significantly  different.
Number  of  buyers bidding  (BUY)  was
not  significant.  Thus,  increased  buyer
competition  had  no  significant  affect  on
buyer  gross  margins.  The  explanatory
power of Model  B was relatively low. One
explanation  among  others  may  be  that
buyers'  slaughter  and  related  costs  were
not incorporated  in the model.
Model C
Model  C  was  estimated  to  determine
whether  or not  buyer competition  affect-
ed teleauction  prices  relative  to prices  at
a  reference  market.  Number  of  buyers
(BUY)  positively and  significantly  affect-
ed  the  teleauction-San  Angelo  price  dif-
ference.  As  the  number  of  packers  that
bid  increased,  the  price  difference  wid-
ened  in  favor  of  the  teleauction.  Trans-
portation  costs  did  not  explain  a  signifi-
cant  portion  of  the  price  difference
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variation.  Estimation  results  of  Model  C
are relatively weak due to the low explan-
atory power  of the model.
Implications  and Conclusions
The primary objective  of this study was
to measure the importance of buyer com-
petition  in the second  phase of  the price
discovery  process.  One part  of  that anal-
ysis was to determine whether number of
buyers affected teleauction  prices.  Results
confirmed that competition  among buyers
(as  measured  by  the  number  of  buyers
bidding at each teleauction)  positively and
significantly  affected  slaughter  lamb  sale
prices.  As  the  number  of  bidders  in-
creased,  so did sale  price.
Results  failed  to confirm  that  as  buyer
competition  increased,  buyer  gross  mar-
gins  declined.  This  relationship  between
number  of buyers and  gross margins  was
expected  to  mirror  the  relationship  be-
tween number  of  buyers and  prices  paid
for lambs.  Specification  error due  to data
unavailability  may  explain  why  estima-
tion  results did  not support  hypothesized
results.
Price  differences  between  teleauction
and San Angelo prices were found to wid-
en  in  favor  of  the  teleauction  with  in-
creased  buyer  competition.  Thus,  the
number of buyers  influenced  the absolute
level of prices  paid by packers  as  well as
relative  prices,  compared  to  a  reference
market.  However,  poor explanatory  pow-
er of the  model  weakens  reliance  placed
on  results  of  the  relationship  between
number of buyers and price differences.
A second part of the analysis was to de-
termine  whether  size  of  buyers  (as  mea-
sured  by  market  shares)  affected  prices
paid by packers  and buyer gross margins.
The four  largest  buyers  of  teleauctioned
lambs bought  83.3 percent  of total lambs
sold,  more  than the  75  percent  four-firm
market  share  level  over  which  Bain  re-
ferred  to  the  market  structure  as  being
very highly oligopsonistic.  Results indicat-
ed that market shares affected prices paid
by packers and buyer gross margins in just
one  instance.  The  largest buyer  (in terms
of market share  of teleauction  purchases)
paid  significantly  lower  prices  than  the
smallest  buyer.  However,  results  may  re-
flect poor purchases by the smallest pack-
er  rather  than  implying  that  the  largest
firm used market power to depress prices.
Buyer gross margins  differed little, de-
spite  the  expected  importance  of  buyer
location.  The  two  closest  buyers  to  the
teleauction  assembly  site  were  the  two
largest buyers.  One paid the lowest  aver-
age  prices  and  the  two  had  the  highest
gross  margins.  The  lone  packer  paying
significantly higher prices and having sig-
nificantly  lower margins  was located  far-
thest from the teleauction.  Thus, price and
gross margin  differences were in part de-
pendent on buyer location as well as mar-
ket share of purchases,  as theoretically  ex-
pected  by  location  theory  (Capozza  and
Van  Order).  However,  other  factors  are
important.  Some packers  may simply buy
more skillfully.  For example, two packers
were  located about 920 miles from the as-
sembly  site. One packer paid significantly
higher  prices  and had significantly  lower
gross margins than the largest buyer, while
no  significant  differences  were  observed
for the other  packer.
In  summary, the  hypothesis  that num-
ber of buyers  positively influences  the ab-
solute and relative  selling price could  not
be rejected,  but the  hypothesis that num-
ber of buyers negatively affects buyer gross
margins was rejected.  Also, the hypothesis
that buyer  market  shares  had  no impact
on either selling price or gross margins was
rejected.  Thus,  buyer  competition  is  im-
portant  in  the  price  discovery  process.
Number,  size,  and  location  of  buyers af-
fected  prices  paid  for  lambs  and  buyer
gross margins.
The  observed  positive  relationship  be-
tween  prices  paid  and number  of  buyers
supports  previous work  (Aspelin and  En-
gelman; Holder; Love and Shuffett; Ward,
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1981,  1983)  and  parallels  expectations
based on both industrial  organization  and
microeconomic  theory.  The observed  re-
lationship  between  market  shares  and
prices supports  research  by  Menkhaus  et
al. and  results  suggested by  industrial  or-
ganization  theory, but differs from results
observed  by Ward (1982a).  Results on the
relationship  between buyer market shares
and  gross  margins  support  industrial  or-
ganization  and microeconomic  theory but
differs  from  the  study  of  Williamson  et
al.
Buyer  competition  appears  to  be  im-
portant  in  discovering  transaction  prices
based on results  reported  here.  However,
further research  is needed to evaluate and
identify  appropriate  methodologies,  data
aggregation  levels,  and data  or  informa-
tion  needs  for  studying  the  relationships
between  market  structure  and  perfor-
mance  (e.g.,  such  criteria  as  price  level,
gross margins,  and  profits).  Absolute  size
differences  of buyers  may  be  a more ap-
propriate  explanatory  variable  than  rela-
tive  size  (as measured  by  market shares),
which incorporates buyer location to some
extent.  Also,  this  study  did  not  address
whether  or  not  larger  buyers  influenced
the absolute  level of prices paid and gross
margins earned  by all buyers, rather  than
simply  relative  prices  and  gross  margins
compared  to smaller  competitors.
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